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Introduction
This article examines the issue of
what constitutes an "accident" or
"occurrerìce" in auto liability policies
that limit the insurer's liability for
indemniry defense, or other benefìts
to a set amount per "accident" or
"occurrence." The issue is important
to both first-party and third-party
claimants as well as the insurers,
because, in auto accidents, it often
means a doublurg of the available
hmits of insurance of any coverâge.
The importance of the issue can be
seefl most spectaculady (though in
commercial general liability insurance
as opposed to âuto insurance) in the
"limits of liability" issue arising out
of the bombing and collapse of the
twin towers of the Wodd Trade Cen-
ter. There, a New York Federal Dis-
trict Court decision that there was a
single "occurrence" under the "limits
of liabiliry" provision meant owner
Silverstein recovered $3.2 billion
instead of $6.4 billion for two "oc-
curfences."
Because there is little Montana
law dehneatrng single "accidents" or
"occuffeflces" for purposes of auto
insurarice, this artlcle will review a
selection of cases from other jurisdic-
tions.
The basic facts of each case will
be given for two reasons: (1) the facts
may squâre up with precedent persua-
sive for the practitroner; and 
€) th"
auto collision fact patterfls are so
interesting in "occurreflce" litigation.
The policy provision
Like all liability insurance poli-
cies, auto insurance policies cover-
ages each contain a "limits of
liability" provision that specifies the
maximum amount for which the
insurer can be liable in a single auto
"accident" of "occuffence." For
example, American Standard Insur-
ance Company of Víisconsin's auto
"limits of liability" clause for Bodily
Injury coverage appears as follows
and can be considered standard:l
Limits of Liability
The limits of liability shown in
the declarations apply, subject to the
followng:
1. The bodily injury liability lrnit for
"each person" is the maximum for
all damages sustatred by all
persons as the results of bodily
injury to one person in any one
occuffefìce.
2. Subject to the bodily injury liability
lmrt for "each person" the bodily
injury liability limit for "each
occurreflce" is the maximum for
bodily injury sustarned by two or
more persons in any orìe occur-
rence.
**x
erage is neglþntly rufl over first by
driver A and second by driver B. Or,
the insured may engage in separate
acts of neglþnce causing damages.
For example, the insured who backs
over a child, then stops, then drives
forward runnng over the child again.
Finally, the trsured may have damaged
several items of property so that dam-
age to each item exceeds the kmrts of
the property damage liability.
If there is no controversy about
what happened, the question of
whether there is more than one acci-
dent or occurrence under an auto
policy has been held to be a question
of law and not a question of fact
precluding surrìmary judgment.2 It
has also been held that, for purposes
of determrnrng this issue, the words
"zccident' and "occutreflce" are
generally rnterchangeable.3
Montana case authority on
number of auto ttaccidentstt or
ttoccuf fences"
Montana has little case authority
on the issue of multrple "ociur-
fences" or "accidents" under auto
"limits of liability' provisions. The
Montana Supreme Court case of
Infiníty InsuÍance Company u
Dodson,a involved a single vehicle
rollover near Havre, Montana tn 1,997
in which three teenagers were njured,
and the unlicensed teenage driver was
killed. Plaintiffs alleged that the nci-
dent involved two "accidents" under
the auto policy because the driver was
negtigent and because her father, in a
separate act of negligence, entrusted
the Ford Bronco to her. The court
did not frnd ambrguity in the policy
"limits of liabiliry" provision as
plaintiffs wished, nor did it find, as
plarntrffs urged, that the policy had to
provide minimum liability hmits for
We will pay no more than these
maximums no matter how many
vehicles are described rn the
declarations or insured persons,
claims, claimants, policies, or
vehicles are involved.
The issue of number of "occur-
reflces" can arise under such clauses
in auto policies in more than one way.
For instance, the insured may câuse
injuries to multiple people each of
whose damages exceed the limits of
liability. An example is the ddver who
negLgently collides with one car,
câreens into a second and comes to
rest on a pedestrian on the sidewalk.
Or the insured may be injured by
separate neglþnt acts of driver A
and driver B. For example, the pedes-
trian insured under UM or UIM cov-
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or pedestrians.
In contrast, Federal
Judge Molloy found two
"occurrences" arising in a
multi-car collision resulturg
in three deaths and injuries
to four persons n Amed-
can l{atÍonal Propetty
and Casualty Company u
Stiilíng, et. al.s
I'ANPAC'I In ANPAC,
the insured auto driven by
Stiding crossed the
both the father and the daughter
under the Mandatory Liability Protec-
tion Act, 533-1-301 MCA (2003).
Because the case involved a single car
rollover, it provides no authority for
the most corfinon situations involv-
ing multiple physical contacts be-
tween the cat and other cars, objects,
consin case of lVeltet u Singet' trr
which the court found a single "oc-
currence" where a bicyclist was
dragged under a cat while the driver
engaged in forward, stopping, and
reverse movements. Judge Molloy
found Welter inapposite because it
rnvolved multiple injuries to the
same person arising out of the same
Armed w¡th proper discovery of
the facts, counsel can at least
rnex¡rnize recovery for the client
in sorne situations wlrere et first
Þlush tlre anount of the insurence
covefage ePPeefs ¡nedequete,
initial impact, while ANPAC in-
volved tu/o separate collisions. Judge
Molloy noted in ANPAC that "there
are three distinct vessels subject to
two distinct traumatic events." He
went on to say: "The first incident
was caused by the centedine cross-
ing. The second was caused by the
location of the wreckage remnarrts
after the first transoired." lcourt's
undedrne] The judge found that
whether an "occurrence" under the
policy was limited by a temporal
definiuon was ambrguous and con-
strued it to provide two "occur-
rences" where two collisions
happened closely in time.
The A-Ìr{PACdecision is rmpor-
tant for three reasons: First, its hold-
ing that the standard term
"occurrence" is ambiguous in the
context of multiple collisions be-
rrveen vehicles; second, its tndng of
a second "occurrence" when little
time elapsed between the initial and
second collisions; and third, because
it doesn t use Stiding's lack of ability
to control his vehicle after the frrst
rmpact as an indicator thatitwas all
one occurrence. As will be seen, these
are tmpofiant points to plaintiff's
counsel.
Other court approaches to the
number of ttoccurrencest'
In ascertaining number of occur-
rences undet auto policies, the courts
have generally used thtee ap-
proaches.T First, they have looked at
the cause or causes of the accident,
focusing, for instance, on proximate
cause and often the neghgence of the
driver who started the
chain collision. Second,
they have looked at the
results of the accident, i.e.,
the number of victims in
separate cars. Third, the
courts, even in cases where
there are cleatly multiple
causes, have used a thhd
approach of looking for an
'funfortunate event" that
triggered liability and re-
centedine while driving south on
Highway 93 rn Montana and sruck
the oncoming McAuley vehicle head-
on in the northbound lane. The
McAuley vehicle came to rest in a
driveway, but the Stiding vehicle
rotated 180 degrees and was struck
by the Quale vehicle, which was
headed north behrnd McAuley. The
Stiding and Quale vehicles came to
rest in the northbound traffic lane.
Three occupants of the McAuley
vehicle were killed, and four occu-
pants of the three autos were injured.
Such multi-car accidents with mul-
tiple catastrophic in¡uries and deaths
will easily exhaust "per accident" or
"per occurrence" limits of BI, UM,
UIM, and Med Pay coverages and
make it necessary for counsel seeking
an adequate recovery for trjured or
deceased clients to examine whether
the accident involves more than one
"occurreflce." Judge Molloy found
that, because the ANP,A.C policy did
not define "occurrence," the term
was ambiguous and might admit, as a
separate occurreflce, a second colli-
sion that happened only moments
after the first. ANP,\C argued that
the court should follow the "cause"
test and specifically follow the Wis-
sults in a findrng of a surgle "occur-
feflce."
Courts most often acknowledge
the existence of both the "cause" and
"results" approach,s seldom referring
to the "event" approach. When an
auto accident involves multiple
deaths, njuries, or damage to mul-
tiple pieces of property, insureds and
victims will likely argue that the court
should determine number of "occur-
fences" or "accidents" by reference
to the number of "results." Unfortu-
natel¡ the courts arc far more likely
to adopt a"cavse" approach as their
determinant.
The ttresultstt approach
l(/hile a "results" approach
would benefit multiple seriously rn-
jured victrms, the unrestricted nature
of some results make the "results"
interpretation of the limit of liability
clause seem unreasonable to many
courts. For instance, the Georgra
Federal Court, tn St. Paul-Metcuty
Indem. Co. u Rutlande refused to
use a results analysis where the
insured's truck struck the side of a
freight train derailng16 cars belong-
rng to 14 different owners. The court
reasoned that a "results" interpreta-
PecB 30 Tnrnr TnBNos - AuruIuN 2003
tion urged by the insuted would
make the policy virtually limitless
depending solely on the number of
claimants. Sq too, tn Amedcan Ca-
suahy Co. v lfeaty,lo the court
refused the results test and found a
single occurrence where the insured
knocked down a telephone pole and
cables after which a vehicle struck the
downed pole while another vehicle
almost simultaneously became en-
tangled and damaged in the cables.
Hence, because the majority of
courts are reticent to determine num-
ber of occurrences by number of
results, counsel is often best advised
to argue the approach that there are
multrple and intervening causes.
The ttcauset'approach
The oldest case frequently cited
is California's 1926 decision rn IIyer
u Intet-Insatance Exchange of
Auto,, Clublrwh^ó the insured's
chauffeur, neglþntly. collided the
insured's Marmon touring car with an
Ovedand âutomobile. The initral
collision broke the Marmon's steering
wheel so that the chauffeur could not
control it, and the Marmon continued
on to collide with a second automo-
bile. The court, recited the facts that
the Marmon had by reason of the
broken steeringwheel become "un-
manageable so that its path of travel
could not be controlled." The court
resolved the case under the general
causal rule that where one neglgent
act or omission is the sole proximate
cause, there is but one accident, even
though there are several resultant
trjuries or losses.
An earþ Washington case, Truck
fns. Exch. u Rohde,1z n 1956,
followed IIy.r. There, the insured
neghgently crossed the centedine
with his auto while three motorcy-
clists approached ftom the opposite
direction riding in echelon at 50
m.p.h. md75 feet apart. The
insured's car struck the first cyclist,
began rotating, struck the second,
rotated some more and struck the
third. Witnesses testified to the fact
that, while all the vehicles were still m
motion they heard three disttnct
"thuds." In Rohde, the court used a
causal approach to find one "acci-
dent" and "occurfeflce" reasoning
that "[t]here was but one proximate,
uninterrupted, and continuing cause
which resulted in all of the infuries
and damage."
The seminal multiple "accidenC'
case, cited more than any other, is
LÍbeny Mutaal Insunnce Co. v
Rawls.l3 Its importance may lie in the
fact that it appears to be the first case
to find two accidents in an automo-
bile ursurance case. In r?aø',/q Bess
was driving an automobile north-
bound at very high speed because
two deputy sheriffs were pursuing
him. He struck the left rear of the
Rawls auto propellng rt off the hrgh-
way anl injuring Rawls and then
continued north veering across the
centedine and colliding head-on with
an oncoming cat driven by Davis.
The court found that the "impacts
occurred 2 to 5 seconds apart and 30
to 300 feetaparf'and concluded that
they were separated by both time and
distance so that "there wete two dis-
turct collisions." The court noted no
evidence of loss of conüol and spe-
cifically found that Bess had control
after the initiat collision and before
the second collision, The court said
their holding that there were two
accidents would be the same regard-
less of whether they applied the "cau-
sation theory" o;if they looked at it
from the pomt of view of a person
sustaming injury, the "effect theory."
One should note how the court
stressed the fact of Bess's control of
the vehicle after the first collision rn
hnding that this event consisted of
two occurrences.
.Another prominent decision that
helped delineate the boundary be-
tween single aad multiple occur-
fefìces, even though the court
concluded that there was only one
insurable "occurrence" was the Wis-
consin decision n 1'972, of Olsen u
Moote.la There, the court conftonted
the issue of whether one views an
"occuffence" or "accident" from the
perspective of "cause" of "effect." In
that case, Olsen was drivmg a car
eastbound on an ihterstate highway
when he crossed the median and
collided with two cars that were west-
bound. Ultimately, the accident in-
volved several vehicles and five
resultrng civil cases were consoli-
dated. The court said:
If viewed from the point of
view of a cause, it would ap-
pear rhñ a single, uninter-
rupied cause that results in a
numbet of injuries or separate
instances of property damages
is yet one "accident" or "oc-
currence." IJ howeuer, that cause
is interraþred or rElaced þt another
' catlre the chain of causation is bro'
ken and more lhan one accident or
' orrrlrreflce has takenplace. (em-
phasis added)
In Olsen, the court found that
"There was virnrally no time or space
rnterval between the two impacts."
The court cited the fact ¡hat ztrral
witness had testified that the colli-
sions had occurred almost instanta-
neously and in less than a second.
Accordingly, the court held there was
only one insurable "occurrence."
"Event of an unfortunate
charâctert' approach
In the 1973 New York decision
of llattfotd Accident & Indem-
nity Co. v lVesolowski,ls a south-
bound driver coll,ided with the side
of an oncoming vehicle and then
immediately continued on to collide
with a second oncoming auto. The
court noted the existence of the three
possible approaches of "cause," "ef-
fect," or "eveflt of an unfortunate
character that took Place without
one's foresight or.expectation."
Though the court asserted that it was
applying the unfortunate event ap-
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proach, they appeared to make a
tLrne and space analysis on causation,
and it is unclear why they didn't just
decide the case on cause. The court
found that the two collisions oc-
curred "but an nstant àpatl," that the
"continuum between the two rmpacts
was unbroken, with no intervening
agent or operative factorl'and con-
cluded that there was but one acci-
dent.
Simrlady, in anothet no-time-no-
space case the court found a sngle
occurrence. In Bacon u MÌIIer,16
lWller's car failed to stop before en-
tering a through street afld collided
with Bacon's car in the middle of the
intersection. The lv{iller vehicle was
deflected over the curb, onto the
sidewalk and nto three pedestrians
who were injured. The court noted
that lMiller's vehicle werìt out of con-
trol followmg the initral collision and
that "the entire transaction could
hardly have involved more than two
seconds or covered a space of more
rhan LB-25 feet." The court con-
cluded that thete was only one acci-
dent regardless of whether it used
"the 'causatiort' test, the 'time and
space' test or the þopular meanrng'¡
test."
The court ìn l(ansas Firc &
Casualty Co. u Koelling,lT distin-
guished Rawls on a time/space
analysis. There, the insured pulled out
to pass ari auto on the highway, col-
lided head on with a truck and, in the
words of the court, "âlmost simulta-
neously hit the car he was trying to
pass." Said the court, " ß,øwk"is fac-
tually different. In that case there was
evidence of a time lapse between
collisions during which the insured
could regain control of his car. In
this case the only evidence availatie,
that of the victims, showed the colli-
sions took place almost simulta-
neously and the insured never had a
chance to regain control of his car."
The.court applied the cause test to
f,rrd only one accident. Note, too, that
the court 'tn Bacon and l(oelling
both found the fact of lack of con-
trol after the first collision to be
worth mentioning rn their decisions
that, in each case, there was a srngle
"occuffence."
In Banner u Raisin Valley,
Inc.,78 the court found a srngle occur-
rence or accident where the rnsured
westbound tractot-trailer crossed the
centedine and entered the eastbound
lane collidng with four cars one dght
aftet the other. The court noted that
there was "absolutely no evidence"
that the driver "regained control of
the vehicle after colliding with the
first car." The court cited llyet,
Rohde, Bacon,artd Olsen for the
proposition that,if the vehicle re-
mains out of control between the
first impact and the second, there is
only a single occurrence.
"Control of the situation" as
a ftctot
As can be seen, courts are quick
to point out a driver's lack of control
as a determinantrhat there was a
single occurrence. Unfornrnatel¡ the
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courts will sometimes avoid frnding
multiple occurrences where there is
physical control by resorting to what
we will call the 'tontrol of the situa-
tion" test. In those cases the driver
regains complete physical control
after the fust impact and causes mul-
tiple impacts. For example, in the
seemingly bizare cases where drivers
drive over a pedestrian, stop, then
reverse direction and drive over the
pedestrian or drag him under their
vehicles, traditional space/time and
control analysis would dictate that the
court find multrple occurrences be-
cause the driver is in control and
often sþificant time and space has
elapsed between movements. FIow-
ever, in such situations, the courts
sometiines impose an additional
"control of the situation" test.
For example, tn Welter v
Singer,Te the driver struck the bicy-
clist then stopped momentarily. He
then drove forward to clear the inter-
section, draggurg the bicyclist under
the car. He stopped again, moved the
car forward another foot, and then
stopped. The other cyclist then got in
and drove the car ten feet in reverse
to get it off the first cyclist who was
catastrophically injured by the several
movemerits. Though the driver of the
car was in complete control while
executing several separate move-
meflts, ttre court refused to follow the
Wisconsin Rawlsprecedent to find
that there were two or more acci-
dents. Though the court conceded
the driver had firll control in his three
operations of the vehiclg it reasoned
that, because the cyclist was at all
times trapped under the vehicle, the
driver "never regained a filll measure
of control over either the car's irirry-
inflicting potential or the situation in
general."
Also, the court distinguished
Rawlson the time/space contìnuum,
noting that "The entire incident
lasted approximately one minute."
The Weltercourt said, "If cause and
result are so simultaneous or so
closeþ linked in time and space as to
be considered by the a.verag¿ person
as one event, courts adopting the
tause'analysis uniforrnly fìnd a
single occurrence or accident." Of its
decision rn Welte4 the Wisconsin
court later said in Voigt,'1Íhus,we
concluded that by applyrng the ordi-
nary meaning and the Olsen cause
theory to these facts, the first impact
with the bicyclist was a predominant,
active and continuing cause, and
therefore only one occurreflce."
Finally, the court noted that,
while Rawls collided with one car artd
then physically drove away and col-
lided with a second, 'V'elter's body
was in continuous contact with the
cat after the initial impact." Conse-
quentl¡ physical relationship between
the tortfeasor and the victim and
even between the victims may be
important facts in arguing sepârate
occurrefìces.
Other courts applied the "control
of the situation" test to find single
occurrences. For example,in Pemco
Mut Ins. Co. w Utterbaclçm the
insured, in attempting to park her car,
lurched onto the sidewalk twice,
pinning a pedestrian against a build-
ing each time and severely rnjuring
him. There was no evidence that she
didnt control the car during execu-
tion of the maneuvers. Nevertheless,
the court applied ttre "control of the
situation" test to limit the comparry's
exposure to a single occurrence. In
BÌsh u Guaranqr hlat'I Ins. Co.,^
the Nevada court used the same test
to call it one "occurreflce" when the
insured backed over a child and on
heanng a neighbor screarn, placed the
car in forward gear and drove over
the child again.
PtogtessÌve Ins. Co. w Detbyf
involved a dump truck driver who
neglþntly backed over the victim,
stopped, and then drove forward
rtnning over the victim again. The
court noted that the driver "was
never in control of the truck's injury
inflicting potential or of the situation
zt afly time during this period." The
court said all the events were iri a
contìnuous series, closely linked in
both time and space and determined
that the toftfeasor's initial neglþnce
was the'þredominate, active and
continuing cause of the injury."
Under this line of cases, the
tortfeasor driver's physicat control
between fast and second impacts is
not determinative of whether there
aÍe sepärate negtigent acts and a
second'bccurrence." Instead, the
court focuses on whether the
tortfeasor knew the situation and had
some ability to control the situation.
Recent cases on number of
ttaccidentst' and ttoccurfencestt
The court found multiple occur-
rences in 1990 tn Illinois l{ational
Ins. Co. u Szczepkowicz.% In that
case,Szczepkowicz was ddving a
ftactor-trailer in foggy conditions and
entered a four-lane higþway frorr' a
driveway. He then attempted to turn
around by entering a crossover in the
median strip between the lanes. In
doingsq he blocked both north-
bound lanes with the trailer. ,\ car
driven by Davis and traveling in the
northbound cùrb lane struck the rear
w-heels of, the stopped tractor-trailer
rnjuring Davis. Szczepkowicz then
pulled the tractor-trailer about 12 feet
forward and stopped again. Five
minutes later, a car driven by Banek
and catrying three family passengers
and traveling in the left northbound
lane collided with the ftactor-trailer
forward of the wheel which Davis
struck.
Illinois National's policy specihed
the liability limit for "oâe accident"
and defined "one acciden(' as "all
bodily injury and property damage
resulting from continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same
conditions." V/e should note that, in
ISO forms, this is often hou¡ the
terms "accident" and "occuffence"
are defined in the policy. The carrier
argued that both accidents happened
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as a result of exposure to substan-
tially the same conditions. FIowever,
the Circuit Court concluded that two
accidents occurred by applying the
space/time test saying it considered
important "two factors, a time ele-
ment and a'continuum between im-
pacts' concept." The court concluded
that the second accident did not re-
sult from continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the sarrie
conditions because of the time that
had elapsed and the factthat
Szczepkowicz moved the truck a
sþificant amount between colli-
sions.
The injured motórists argued that
each of the collisions "resulted from
neglþnt acts,".while the insurer
argued that the act that caused all the
clarms was Szczepkowicz's driving
the tractor-trailer orito the highlvay in
the fog. The court noted that amaior-
ity of courts 'have concluded that
the number of occurrences is deter-
mined by referring to the cause or
causes of the damage (the "cause"
theory), as opposed to the number of
individual claims or injuries (the
"effect" theory).
The court arnlyzed Rawls,
Wesolowski,artd Olsen u Moore'n
the process of concluding that there
were two accidents. It reasoned that
the two collisions could not be said
to result from the same neglþrìt act.
"This is not a situation where, after
the rnitial impact, one vehicle imme-
diately'ricochets' off the other and
within seconds collides with a third."
The court found that, unlike Olsen
artd WesolowskÍ, there was no single
force nor an unbroken or uninter-
rupted continuum that, once set in
motiorr, caused multiple injuries.
Importantly, the court noted that
Szczepkowikz never lost control of
his vehicle after Davis collided with
him.
A couple of recent decisions in
Washington state deal with the issue
of multiple occurrerìces. The court
held there were multiple "occur-
rences" n Mid-Cenruqr Insurance
Company u lfenault% Henault was
struck and knocked from her motor-
cycle at an intersection by an auto
driven by Curry. As she lay in the
street, a second car driven by Butler
slowed upon seeing something ìn the
road and then stopped on realizing it
was a person. Unforhrnatel¡ a truck
driven by Benton pulled around But-
ler on the inside lane and a "split-
second" later noticed Henault lyrng rn
the road and hit her after braking.
The court found the sequence of
events wâs not uninterrupted and
determined that there were two acci-
dents or occurrerìces. The court said,
"Although the record does not indi-
cate precisely how long Henault lay in
the roadway after the'first impact, it '
is clear that sufficient time had
passed for Butler to arrive at the
scene, see Ffenault lying in the road-
way, slow down, and stop before the
second knpact." The court distin-
guished Washin5on's prior precedent,
Track Ins. Exch. u Rohde,2s (1956)
in which the insured crossed the
centedine with his auto and struck
three motorcycles one after another.
In Rohde, the court reasoned that
"[t]here was but one proximate, unin-
terrupted, and continuing cause
which resulted in all of the injuries
and danrage."
Gteengo u Publíc Employees
Matual fnsurance Company,% is
remarkable because it appears the
Supreme Court of Washington raised
the issue of number of accidents sua
sponte and over the insurer's objec-
tion that the issue had not been
raised by the plaintiff before. That
fact is remarkable given that Greengo
was a tweflty-seven-year-old woman
rendered quadrþlegrc when the car in
which she was a passenger rear-ended
an autq then was rear-ended by the
auto following it. The court re-
manded the case for factual determi-
nation of proximate cause and said,
"Under our approâch if each acci-
dent, collision, or injury has its own
proximate câuse then each will be
deemed a separate 'accident' for in-
surarice policy purposes even if the
two accidents occurred coincident, or
neady coincident, in time." For the
court, the issue was whether the colli-
sions had two separate proximate
causes which is likely to hinge on
conduct of the following driver and
whether that driver had the ability to
act or make choices to avoid the
collision.
In Fatmerc fns. Exchange u
Stt(' the facts reflect a similar situa-
tion insofar as the car the insured was
followng stopped abruptly, and the
insured stopped also only to be
struck from the xearby a following
driver. The driver of the first car fled
the scene of the accident. For pur-
poses of UM/UIM.orr"rug", th"
insured contended there were two
occurrerìces, but the court summarily
disagreed saying'Even if we as-
sume, arguendo, that the car stopping
in front of Star and the collision with
her car by the following car consti-
tuted two separate incidents, that
conclusion provides no support for
the position that two separate acci-
dents or occurrences also ensued.
Rather, one accident, caused by two
drivers, occurred here."
Making two 66occurrencestt con-
sistent with one continuous tort
Gause
If one actor's causal neglþnce is
continuing thtough the second im-
pact, does rhatmean there must orrly
be one "occurrence?" In the'1,994
Wisconsin decision of VoÌgt u
RÌestetetjs the court said no. The
case is important because it estab-
lishes that an accident can involve
two occurrences for insurance pur-
poses even thougþ it is found to
involve a continuing proximate cause
for purposes of tort. VoÌgt tnvolved
separate collisions of three vehicles.
A car driven by Brockman was
headed westbound and crossed the
centedine colliding head-on with a
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car driven by Voigt who was east-
bound. Haase then approached from
the east, pulled over, and stopped on
the north shoulder. Subsequentl¡
Riesterer approached from the east
and crashed into the rear of
Brockman's car driving it nto Voigt's
vehicle. The parties agreed that Voigt
suffered injury in each of the two
collisions, and Voigt's pâssenger was
killed. Both Brockman arid Riesterer
were drivtrg while intoxicated.
Brockman's policy with American
Standard Insurance Company of
Wisconsin contained a standard "lim-
its of liability" clause that limited the
damages sustained "in any ofle occur-
rerìce." The Wrsconsin Supreme
Court in Olsen w Moore,2e (1972)
held the term "occurrence" to be
unambrguou s. In VoÍgt, after noting
that holding, the Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin held that Voigt, Brockman
and Riesterer were involved in two
separate "occuffences." The coutt
said:
We conclude that there were
two separate occurreflces
within the meanrng of the in-
surance policy. First, there was
the collision when Brockman
crossed the centedine and
struck Voigt. Then there was a
time interval of three to five
minutes before the next impact
occurred. The cause of the
hrst impact was interrupted
such that the cause and result
were not simultaneous or so
closely linked in trme and
space to be considered one
event by the average person.
Thus, by applyrng the ordinary
meanng, the first impact and
the second impact were two
separate occurrences.30
It is notable that Riesterer had
control of his car at the time he col-
lided with Brockman, a factor the
court did not mention. We should
note also that no one contended that
when Riesterer's car propelled
Brockman's into Voi5's a second
time, it constituted a third occurrence.
Brockman v/as unconscious, had no
control over his car as it was pro-
pelled forwatd, and the impact of
Riesterer's car into Brockman's, which
propelled Voig's ahead zgarn,were all
continuous and closely linked in time
and space.
FIowever, the second issue in
Voþtwas whether the lower court
erred ìn frnding Brockman to be ten
percent causally negLgent for the
second collision of Riesterer rnto the
Brockman and Voig vehicles. The
court said:
Brockman's initial neghgence in
striking Vorgt was such that the
second rmpact precipitated by
Riesterer was a natural and
probable consequence of his
original neglþnce. Although
Brockman was unconscious
when the second ffipact oc-
curred, being rear ended by
Riesterer was a natural and
probable consequence of the
initial collision and subsequent
location of Brockman's vehicle.
Thus, his actions constituted
continuing negligence.
The court reasoned rhat,ìf a third
party intervenes, the causal connec-
tion of the first party's negligence is
not necessarily interrupted and found
Brockman to be causally negligent.
Most important, the court said, "De-
terminng the number of occurrences
is not contingent upon f,rndrng two
separate acts of negltgence." In
VoigtrThe Coutt of Appeals of
Wisconsin relied on Wisconsrn's prior
precedents, Olsen u Moote (1972)
and lYeltet u Singet (1985). Both
cases had concluded that there was
only one insurable "occurrence" but
helped delneate the boundary be-
tween sngle and multiple occurrerìces.
The problem of "triggering event"
analysis
In siruations nvolving separate
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acts of negligence, some courts have
reverted to analysis of the liability
"trigçring event" as opposed to the
'tause" or "effect" approaches to
avoid frndrng multiple occurrences.
For example, in NewJersey's Saå ø
Dennís,37 n 1992, two of the defen-
dant auto dealer's employees were
delivering rìew autos that they raced
on a public street. They neg!þntly
collided their vehicles at 70-80 m.p.h.
causing one of them to spin and
collide with plaintiff's vehicle; which
in turn collided with a power pole
killing ari occupant and rnjuring oth-
ers. The court found only one "oc-
cuffence," rulingthat the initial
collision was an antecedent cause and
not an "occurrence." The jWest Vir-
ginia court in 1985, found a single
occurrence tn ShamblÍn u. hlation-
wÍde Mut Ins. Co.,32 where one of
the defendant's drivers neg!þntly
sþaled another by CB radio that it
v/as sâfe to pass, and the other driver
neglþntly passed colliding with
plaintrff. While cause analysis mrght
indicate two separate causes, "trigger-
ìng event" analysis resulting in the
court's fìnding that the drivers'negli-
gence constituted an antecedent cause
and not a, separate "occufrerìce."
Conclusion
Analysis of these cases discloses
several factors thatmay be determi-
native and should be argued on the
issue of whether there are multiple
"accidents" or "occufrences" for
purposes of triggering additional
limits of auto insurance coverage.
Those factors include the following:
1. Whether the language of the policy
"limits of liability" provision is
ambiguous: If the terms,"acci-
dent" or "occuffence" afe not
defined, there is grc ter chance the
court will fìnd them ambþous in
the context of the multiple impact
accident.
2. Whether the insureds'neglþent
conduct caused multiple severe
results: If so, the court may use a "results" approach to find multiple
"occuffences."
3. Whether there are multiple causes of the collision at least one of which is
intervening: If the court caîtrzce ofle cause as beingproximate and continu-
ous, it is far more likely to rule that there is one "occurrence." ff it finds a
cause that is intervening ìtmay find two 'bccurrences."
4. Whether there is significant physical distance between each point of impact:
The greater the distance, the more chance that the court will frrd a separate
"occurrence" applying a time time/space approach to causation.
5. Whether there is significant time between each impact: The more time that
ww'fry'.atla.or
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elapses between the first impact
and the second the greater the
chance the court will apply the
time/space approach to causation
find a second "occurreflce."
6. Whether there is continuity of
vehicular motion: If the insured
offending vehicle continues in
motion ftomniad. impact through
the secondary impact, it increases
the chance ttrat the court will find
a single "occurrence." A vehicle
that comes to rest between impacts
or starts and stops between
impacts may be evidence of
multiple "occurrences."
7. Whether the driver regains physical
control of the offending vehicle
after t}re iniúal impact If the
driver regains control zfter the flrr:st
impacÇ chances are much greàter
that the court will frrd multiple
'bccufreflces."
B. Whether the driver recognizes the
injury-causing potential of the
situat-ion and has a choice to take
some action to avoid the second
impact: If the driver doesn't
rccognize that operation of the
vehicle is causing injury or see how
he or she can avoid continuing to
injure, the court may find a single
occurrence by reason of the
insured's lack of 'tontrol of the
situation " even in the face of
complete ability to control physically.
9. Whether the mulúple parúes
causing the accident are acting tr
concert, i.e., racing- If they are,
courts are more Lkeþ to find their
acts are a"drggeitngevent" or
single cause of a single 'bccur-
rence." If they are Írot, chances are
much better that their acts will be
separate pròximate causes of
multiple "occurrences."
Once agaln, plaintiff t counsel
should be mindful of the defnition
of 'bccurrence" of "accident' 
^ ^y
case where the claimants' injuries and
damages exceed the policy limits,
individually or combined. This is
particulaÄy important when there are
more than two vehicles or drivers
involved in the collision or where the
claimants have more than a single
irnpact causing their injuries. In these
cases, it is important for counsel to
conduct discovery with an eye on the
cases interpreting these key policy
words, to make sure the proper facts
are thorouglrly explored with the
witnesses and rnvestrgating law en-
forcement. Armed with proper dis-
covery of the facts, counsel can zt
least maximize recovery for the client
in some situations where at ftrst
blush the amount of the insurance
coverage âppears inadequate.
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flniform District Court Rules - Comments Requested
The Uniform District Court Rules found in Title 25,Chapterl9, MC,{. are currently
being revieu¡ed. The Uniform District Court Rule Commission solicits cornments arid
suggestions on the existing Uniform District Court Rules ând suggestions fot additional rules.
Please provide wfitten comments to John Gnnt ^t 203 N. Ewing Helen4 MT 59601
orjgran@jngn.c0m.We would âppreciate yorrr comments and suggestions by
December 31, 2003 for consideration at the Commissiort's next meeting.
Tru¡r- TneNos - Au,l:rnux 2003 PecB 41
